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ABSTRACT:Managers have great discretion in determining forecast characteristics, but
little is known about how managerial incentives affect these characteristics. This paper
examines whether managers strategically choose forecast precision for self-serving
purposes. Building on the prior finding that the market reaction to vague forecasts is
weaker than its reaction to precise forecasts, we find that for management forecasts
disclosed before insider sales, more positive (negative) news forecasts are more (less)
precise than other management forecasts. The opposite applies to management
forecasts disclosed before insider purchases. These results are consistent with
managers strategically choosing forecast precision to increase stock prices before
insider sales and to decrease stock prices before insider purchases. Additional analyses
indicate that the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision is less
pronounced when institutional ownership is high or when disclosure risk is high, and is
more pronounced when investors have difficulty in assessing the precision of managers’
information.
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precision.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I
ssuing earnings forecasts is an important channel that managers use to convey information to
investors. Unlike mandatory disclosures such as annual reports, management forecasts are
voluntary and managers have considerable discretion on whether and how to provide earnings
forecasts. Motivated by the usefulness of management forecasts, prior research has examined
extensively what determines their frequency (e.g., Skinner 1994, 1997; Lang and Lundholm 2000;
Cheng and Lo 2006). Yet despite the considerable discretion that managers have in issuing the
forecasts and the importance of such characteristics as forecast precision, forecast horizon, and
supplementary disclosure to market reactions, it is not well understood how managers’ incentives
affect these characteristics (Hutton et al. 2003; Hirst et al. 2008).
In this paper, we focus on one important characteristic of management forecasts—forecast
precision—and examine how managerial incentives affect the choice of forecast precision. We
choose to focus on forecast precision, or specificity, for two reasons. First, precision is one of the
most important forecast characteristics over which managers have a great deal of discretion.
Managers can issue qualitative or quantitative forecasts, and the latter may take the form of point
forecasts, range forecasts, or open-ended forecasts. More than 80 percent of the quantitative
forecasts compiled by Thomson Financial are in the range format of estimates with explicit upper
and lower bounds, and there is a large degree of variation in forecast width (the difference between
the upper and lower bounds). One might even argue that managers have greater discretion over the
precision of their earnings forecasts than over whether to provide forecasts in the first place (Hirst et
al. 2008). Managers cannot always withhold information because it is part of their fiduciary duty to
update and correct previous disclosures. Furthermore, withholding information can increase the risk
of litigation and can damage a manager’s reputation (Skinner 1994).
Second, forecast precision has a significant effect on market reactions to management forecasts.
A number of theoretical papers, such as Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Subramanyam (1996),
argue that the magnitude of the market reaction to a disclosure is positively related to its precision,
and empirical studies examining the impact of management forecast precision on stock returns and
analyst forecast revisions provide support for this argument (e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Baginski et
al. 2007).
Building on prior research, we identify the most frequently investigated managerial incentive in
the voluntary disclosure literature, insider trading, and examine whether it provides managers with
incentives to choose forecast precision strategically. Given that the precision of management
forecasts has a significant effect on stock prices—more precise forecasts have a larger impact on
stock prices than vague forecasts—we argue that trading incentives affect forecast precision and
that the effect depends on both the sign and magnitude of the news. As managers prefer a higher
stock price prior to insider sales, we predict that good news disclosed before insider sales is more
precise, and that the more positive the news is, the more precise the forecast is.1 Similarly, we
hypothesize that bad news disclosed before insider sales is less precise, and that the more negative
the news is, the more vague the forecast. In other words, we predict a positive association between
forecast news and the precision for management forecasts issued before insider sales. Given that
prior research finds a positive association between forecast news and precision (e.g., Skinner 1994;
Choi et al. 2010), these arguments imply that the association is more positive for management
forecasts issued before insider sales than for those not followed by insider trading. In contrast, as
managers benefit from a lower stock price before insider purchases, we predict the opposite for
1 In line with prior research, we calculate forecast news as the difference between the mid-point estimate of
management forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release
share price.
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management forecasts disclosed before insider purchases, i.e., a less positive association between
forecast news and the precision for management forecasts issued before insider purchases than for
those not followed by insider trading.
To test our hypotheses, we examine a sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued
in the 1999–2006 period. We use the negative of forecast width (the magnitude of the range for
range forecasts and zero for point forecasts) to measure forecast precision. To test our predictions,
we regress forecast precision on forecast news, indicators for insider sales or purchases, and their
interactions. We also control for other determinants of forecast precision, such as managers’
information uncertainty, investors’ demand for information, the passage of Regulation Fair
Disclosure, equity issuance, and the precision of past management forecasts.
Consistent with prior research, we find an overall positive association between forecast news
and forecast precision; the more positive the news, the more precise the forecast. More importantly,
we find that, consistent with our hypotheses, trading incentives systematically affect the association
between forecast news and precision. We find that forecast precision is more positively correlated
with forecast news for management forecasts issued before insider sales than for other management
forecasts. For forecasts issued before insider purchases, we find a less positive correlation between
forecast news and precision. To highlight the notion that the direction of insider trading’s effect on
forecast precision depends on the sign of the news, in an additional analysis we replace the
continuous forecast news variable with indicators for the sign of the news. We find that, compared
with management forecasts issued at other times, good news issued before insider sales is more
precise and bad news before insider sales is less precise, whereas good news issued before insider
purchases is less precise and bad news before insider purchases is more precise. Overall, these
results indicate that managers choose to issue forecasts in a form that increases the impact of the
forecast on stock prices if that impact is desirable and reduces it if it is undesirable.
To obtain further support for our main inferences and to provide additional insights, we also
examine three conditioning variables that can affect the relation between managerial incentives and
forecast precision. First, previous research shows that institutional investors play an important
monitoring role and demand more transparent disclosure than individual investors (e.g., Bushee
1998; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007). If this is the case, then managers’ strategic behavior is
likely to be mitigated by the presence of institutional investors. Consistent with this prediction, we
find that the effect of trading incentives on the association between forecast news and precision is
weaker when institutional ownership is high than when it is low.
Second, while we argue that the risk of strategically changing forecast precision is lower than
the risk associated with other forms of managerial discretion in the voluntary disclosure domain,
such as withholding news, it is not risk-free, and the extent of the risk varies. The risk of disclosing
forward-looking information arises in our setting if the information disclosed is subsequently
proven to be wrong. The more precise the forecast, the more likely it is to be proven wrong because
actual earnings may fall outside the forecast range and, thus, the higher the disclosure risk. Since
managers have incentives to increase the precision of their forecasts when they disclose good news
before selling shares and when they disclose bad news before buying shares, the disclosure risk is
higher in these cases. In contrast, when managers disclose bad news before selling shares or good
news before buying shares, they have incentives to decrease the precision of their forecasts, leading
to lower disclosure risk. Given that managers are less likely to engage in strategic behavior when
the litigation risk is higher, we posit that managers are less likely to act strategically in the high-risk
scenario where good news precedes insider sales or bad news precedes insider purchases than in the
low-risk scenario where bad news precedes insider sales or good news precedes insider purchases.
Our results are consistent with this prediction.
Third, managers’ abilities to choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes depend on
investors’ abilities to assess the precision of managers’ information. If investors are able to ‘‘see
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through’’ the precision game and react accordingly, then strategically choosing forecast precision
will not benefit managers. Thus, we expect that managers are more likely to strategically choose
forecast precision when investors have greater difficulty in evaluating the precision of their
information. Using several variables to capture the level of this difficulty, we find results consistent
with our prediction.
We also conduct several additional tests to enrich our analyses and to ensure the robustness of
our results. First, we replicate prior work supporting our assumption that precise forecasts are
associated with stronger market reactions than are vague forecasts. Second, we find evidence
suggesting that our results are not driven by the reverse causality (i.e., disclosure precision affecting
the existence of insider trading) or self-selection in the issuance of management forecasts. Third, we
find that our results are robust to alternative research design choices, such as using the magnitude of
insider trading rather than indicators for such trading, and to controlling for the effect of
contemporaneous earnings announcements for bundled management forecasts.
Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature in several important ways. First,
Hirst et al. (2008) suggest that forecast characteristics such as forecast precision are the most
controllable, yet least studied, dimension of management forecasts. Although several studies
(Baginski and Hassell 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005) have examined the economic determinants of
forecast precision, we extend this line of research by demonstrating the importance of managerial
incentives in determining forecast precision. We also investigate the conditions under which the
impact of managerial incentives is weaker or stronger.
Second, this study extends the corporate disclosure literature by providing evidence that
managers strategically determine forecast precision for self-serving purposes. Although several
studies find that managerial incentives affect corporate disclosure in general and management
forecast practices in particular, their primary focus is on whether managers overstate earnings (e.g.,
Beneish 1999), disclose information (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006), or bias the information they
disclose (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). Our study complements these studies by focusing on
managers’ discretion in choosing the precision of their forecasts.
This study builds upon and extends Rogers (2008). Rogers argues that when deciding the
quality of disclosure in response to insider trading incentives, managers face a trade-off between
maintaining their information advantage and reducing litigation risk. He finds that managers tend to
issue forecasts with high disclosure quality before insider sales to reduce litigation risk, but issue
forecasts with low disclosure quality before insider purchases to maintain their information
advantage. There are two key differences between our study and Rogers (2008). First, we argue that
managers’ disclosure decisions are a joint function of insider trading incentives and the nature of the
news disclosed. It is in the managers’ best interests to increase (decrease) the quality of the
disclosure when the market reaction to that disclosure is favorable (unfavorable) to them. Our
empirical analyses confirm that the quality of management forecasts disclosed before insider sales
(purchases) varies with forecast news, and it is not uniformly better (worse). For example, for
management forecasts issued before insider sales, managers prefer to issue more precise forecasts
for more positive news but less precise forecasts for more negative news. While the former can be
regarded as of high quality, the latter can be regarded as of low quality. Second, Rogers (2008) uses
the change in liquidity around disclosures as a measure of disclosure quality. In contrast, we
examine an observable action taken by managers and thus provide more contextual evidence. The
drawback of our approach is that forecast precision is only one aspect of managers’ disclosure
decisions. In sum, taken together the two studies provide a more complete picture of the managerial
decision-making process in the choice of voluntary disclosure quality.
Section II next discusses the related literature on management forecasts and develops our
hypotheses. Section III describes the data and research design. Section IV reports the main analyses.
Section V presents additional analyses, and Section VI concludes.
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II. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Related Prior Research
Managers have an information advantage over outside investors, and they rely on both
mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure to reduce this information asymmetry. A
management earnings forecast is one of the most common types of voluntary disclosure and
prior research finds that management forecasts provide important information to the capital markets
(e.g., Baginski and Hassell 1990; Pownall et al. 1993; Coller and Yohn 1997; Rogers and Stocken
2005; Rogers 2008). Healy and Palepu (2001) and Hirst et al. (2008) review this literature.
Because management forecasts are voluntary, managers have considerable discretion as to
whether, when, and what to disclose. The extant literature indicates that while managers use
voluntary disclosure to reduce information asymmetry, they also exploit their discretion over such
disclosure for self-serving purposes. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) document that
managers reduce the exercise price of option grants by disclosing bad news and withholding good
news prior to option grant dates. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that firms increase the frequency
of disclosure and issue more favorable news prior to raising external capital. Cheng and Lo (2006)
document that managers disclose more bad news before buying shares of their firms. Brockman et
al. (2008) find that the frequency and magnitude of bad news (good news) disclosures are higher
(lower) before share repurchases, presumably to deflate stock prices so that firms can buy back
shares at a lower price. Overall, the evidence in this area indicates that the frequency of
management forecasts is affected by managers’ incentives.
Although managers have opportunities to exploit their discretion over earnings forecasts,
investors can use subsequent audited earnings reports and information from other sources to evaluate
the credibility of these forecasts.2 If managers are thought to have withheld information or issued
biased forecasts, then investors may sue them and managers’ reputations might be damaged (Skinner
1994, 1997). The risk of such litigation is particularly high when insider trading is involved. Insider
trading is subject to the ‘‘disclose or abstain’’ rule, which requires that insiders in possession of
material nonpublic information either disclose it to the public before trading or abstain from trading.
Such litigation risk and ex post discipline greatly restrain managerial discretion over whether and what
to disclose. Consistent with the notion that managers are concerned about litigation risk, Cheng and
Lo (2006) find that managers are not more likely to withhold bad news or issue good news before
insider sales. Consistent with the disciplinary role of subsequent earnings reports in reducing
management forecast bias, Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that managers have incentives to provide
biased forecasts only when investors have difficulty in detecting that bias.
This study takes the decision to issue management forecasts as a given and explores how
managerial incentives affect managers’ decisions regarding forecast precision. Compared to
withholding information or providing biased forecasts, providing information with desirable
precision is subject to lower litigation risk. Managers can issue point, range, or qualitative estimates
and, for range forecasts, they can choose the size of the range. The literature suggests that forecast
precision affects the market reaction to earnings guidance. For example, Kim and Verrecchia (1991)
and Subramanyam (1996) show that more precise information leads to a larger market reaction.
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, Baginski et al. (1993) find that point forecasts are
associated with a greater market reaction than range forecasts.3 If more precise forecasts are
2 Hutton et al. (2003) argue and find that managers provide supplementary disclosure to increase the credibility of
their forecasts.
3 Other studies (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993), however, find an insignificant relation between market response and
forecast form. In a recent working paper, Baginski et al. (2007) confirm the finding in Baginski et al. (1993). We
also confirm these results in this study. See Section V for details.
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associated with stronger market reactions, then managers can strategically choose forecast precision
to influence the market reaction for self-serving purposes. Indeed, Hughes and Pae (2004) show
analytically that entrepreneurs who plan to sell shares choose high precision for good news to
increase stock prices and low precision for bad news to mitigate the decline in stock prices.
In the next section, we discuss how managerial incentives can affect the precision of
management forecasts. We focus on insider trading, the incentive most often examined by prior
research.
Hypothesis Development—Insider Trading, Forecast News, and Forecast Precision
When managers trade shares of their companies, they have incentives to increase trading gains
by utilizing their information advantage. Penman (1982) and Noe (1999) find that managers sell
more shares after good news than after bad news, and buy more shares after bad news than after
good news, suggesting that managers strategically choose the timing of their trading activities to
increase insider trading gains. Building on these findings, Cheng and Lo (2006) argue that
managers may change the frequency of voluntary disclosure before insider trading and find that
managers are more likely to disclose bad news before buying shares. Using the change in liquidity
to proxy for disclosure quality, Rogers (2008) finds that managers strategically change disclosure
quality in response to personal trading incentives. He finds that disclosure quality is, on average,
higher before insider sales and lower before insider purchases. Rogers and Stocken (2005)
document that when the market has difficulty detecting managers’ misreporting, managers are more
likely to issue optimistic (pessimistic) earnings forecasts before insider sales (purchases).
However, withholding information or issuing biased forecasts is subject to substantial litigation
risk (e.g., Skinner 1994; Cheng and Lo 2006). Under the ‘‘disclose or abstain’’ rule, managers are
obligated to issue forecasts before engaging in insider trading. We argue that given the disclosure of
news, managers can increase trading gains by manipulating forecast precision to influence the
market response to the news. Since the benefit of selling shares increases with stock prices, we
expect that managers are more likely to be vague when issuing negative news before insider sales
and are more likely to be precise when issuing positive news before insider sales. In contrast,
because managers benefit from a lower stock price when buying shares, we posit that when
managers are about to buy stocks, they are more likely to be vague when issuing positive news and
precise when issuing negative news.
Note that we expect both the sign and magnitude of the news to affect the forecast precision
decision. Whether the news is good or bad affects the direction of insider trading’s impact on
management forecast precision, whereas the magnitude of the news affects the size of that impact.
Because news of greater magnitude has a larger impact on stock prices and insider trading gains,
managers’ incentives to influence forecast precision are expected to be stronger when the magnitude
of the news is greater. Therefore, we consider how the impact of insider trading on forecast
precision varies with forecast news. Because previous research (e.g., Skinner 1994; Choi et al.
2010) finds that, on average, better news is more precise than worse news, we expect this positive
association to be more pronounced for management forecasts issued before insider sales and less
pronounced for those issued before insider purchases.4
4 Prior research attributes the positive association between forecast news and precision to managers’ preference
for higher stock prices in general or, in other words, to their preference for stronger reactions to good news and
weaker reactions to bad news. Because of this general trend, we do not state our hypothesis as the net association
between forecast news and precision before insider trading.
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The above discussion leads to our main hypothesis:
H1: The association between forecast precision and news is more positive for management
forecasts issued before insider sales and less positive for forecasts issued before insider
purchases than it is for other management forecasts.
Hypothesis Development—Conditioning Factors
Institutional Ownership
By strategically disclosing either vague or precise information before insider trading, managers
can influence the market reaction to management forecasts in the direction that is beneficial to them.
Such self-serving behavior comes at the expense of current and/or potential shareholders. It thus
follows that such behavior is less likely to be effective when shareholders are able to monitor
managers closely. Prior research documents that institutional investors can serve as effective
monitors and usually demand more transparent corporate disclosure (e.g., Bushee and Noe 2000;
Healy and Palepu 2001). Institutional investors often attend conference calls and closely follow
management earnings forecasts. In addition, they collect firm-specific information from various
sources on an ongoing basis and strive to reduce their information disadvantage. Consistent with
these arguments, Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that firms with block shareholders issue more
precise forecasts, and Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that firms with higher institutional ownership are
more likely to issue precise earnings forecasts.
If institutional investors can effectively monitor managers’ forecast behavior and demand more
transparent disclosure, then they can restrain managers from engaging in strategic behavior in
choosing forecast precision. Thus, our second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as
hypothesized in H1, is less pronounced for firms with high institutional ownership than
for firms with low institutional ownership.
Disclosure Risk
Although we argue that a strategic decision regarding management forecast precision is
subject to less risk than withholding news or providing biased forecasts, it is not risk-free, and the
extent of the risk varies. The risk that is associated with the disclosure of forward-looking
information, or disclosure risk in short, arises in our setting if the information disclosed is
subsequently proven to be wrong (Cheng and Lo 2006). The more precise the forecast, the more
likely it is to be proven wrong (i.e., the actual earnings may fall outside the forecast range), and
the higher the disclosure risk (Choi et al. 2010). As previously discussed, managers have
incentives to increase the precision of management forecasts when they disclose good news
before selling shares or when they disclose bad news before buying shares, leading to greater
disclosure risk. In contrast, when managers disclose bad news before selling shares or good news
before buying shares, they have incentives to decrease the precision of their forecasts; this can
reduce disclosure risk because forecasts with wider ranges are less likely to be proven wrong (i.e.,
the actual earnings are more likely to fall inside the forecast range). Because managers are less
likely to engage in strategic behavior when the litigation risk is high (e.g., Baginski et al. 2002),
we expect that managers are less likely to act strategically in choosing management forecast
precision in the high disclosure risk scenario in which good news precedes insider sales or bad
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news precedes insider purchases than in the low-risk scenario in which bad news precedes insider
sales or good news precedes insider purchases.5
The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as
hypothesized in H1, is less pronounced in the high disclosure risk scenario in which
good news precedes insider sales or bad news precedes insider purchases than in the low-
risk scenario in which bad news precedes insider sales or good news precedes insider
purchases.
Investors’ Ability to Assess the Precision of Managers’ Information
Rogers and Stocken (2005) argue that the likelihood of managers providing biased forecasts
depends on investors’ ability to evaluate the accuracy of the disclosed information. In a similar
vein, we argue that investors’ ability to assess the precision of managements’ information is
important if managers strategically choose the forecast precision and guide the market for their own
benefit. When investors can estimate the precision of managers’ information with a fair degree of
accuracy, they are doubtful of forecasts that deviate from the expected precision level. For example,
if investors assume that managers have received a precise signal about future earnings, then
managers are less able to effectively use their discretion to blur the forecast. Similarly, if investors
believe that managers cannot precisely estimate future performance, then managers have weaker
incentive to strategically choose forecast precision levels for self-serving purposes. In contrast, if
investors do not know the precision level of the information that managers have, then managers can
strategically choose the forecast precision level. Thus our final hypothesis is:
H4: The impact of insider trading incentives on management forecast precision, as
hypothesized in H1, is more pronounced if investors have greater difficulty in assessing
the precision of managers’ information.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN
Sample and Data
We obtain our sample of management forecasts over the 1999–2006 period from the First Call
Historical Database. We include both quarterly and annual forecasts of earnings per share (EPS) for
the current quarter or year.6 To focus on voluntary earnings forecasts, we exclude pre-
announcement forecasts issued after the corresponding fiscal period-end.7 Unlike some previous
studies (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006), we cannot use the market reaction to earnings forecasts to
capture the nature of news because our focus, forecast precision, affects the magnitude of market
reaction. Instead, we determine the nature of news based on the comparison between management
forecasts and the prevailing consensus analyst forecasts. Accordingly, we exclude qualitative and
5 Note that the discussion of the variation in disclosure risk underlying H3 is within the setting of strategically
choosing forecast precision. It has no bearing on other strategic decisions, such as the withholding of
information.
6 If there are both quarterly and annual forecasts on the same day, then we retain only the former because quarterly
forecasts, on average, have a larger effect on the market than annual forecasts (e.g., Pownall et al. 1993; Baginski
et al. 1993).
7 Earnings forecasts issued during a quarter do not need to be furnished to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), whereas pre-announcements after the quarter end must be.
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open-ended forecasts. The foregoing procedure leaves us with an initial sample of 41,543
management forecasts.
From this initial sample, we exclude forecasts for which the other data we require for our
analyses are missing. First, we exclude 15,387 observations for which the data needed to
calculate regression variables other than forecast news are missing from the Compustat, Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), or Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S)
databases. Second, we exclude 11,616 management forecasts for which there are no
corresponding analyst forecast data and for which we are thus unable to determine forecast
news.8 Finally, when the consensus analyst forecast for an observation falls within the range of
the management forecast, we cannot unambiguously classify it as good or bad news. To increase
the power of our tests, we thus follow Baginski et al. (1993) and exclude 3,741 such observations,
although including them in the analyses leads to qualitatively similar results.9 This sample
selection procedure leaves us with a final sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued
by 1,991 unique firms.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the yearly and quarterly distribution of management forecasts. The
table indicates an overall increase in forecast frequency and/or First Call coverage over the sample
period, with 267 forecasts issued in 1999 and 2,169 issued in 2006. Management forecasts are
distributed roughly evenly across the four fiscal quarters, with fewer in the first quarter and more in
the fourth. In our sample, 2,185 management forecasts (20.23 percent of the sample) are point
estimates and 8,614 (79.77 percent) are range estimates. This untabulated distribution highlights the
variation in forecast precision.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the frequency of management forecasts by the sign of the forecast
news. Forecast news is calculated as the difference between the mid-point estimate of the
management forecast of EPS and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release share
price. Because we use the average of analyst forecasts and the point estimate or mid-point of the
range forecast to calculate forecast news, this variable is exactly 0 in less than 0.5 percent of the
sample. Following prior research (e.g., Clement et al. 2003; Rogers and Van Buskirk 2011), we
treat management forecasts with forecast news of a small magnitude as neutral forecasts. More
specifically, we classify management forecasts for which the absolute value of the forecast news
is in the bottom quintile of the sample distribution as neutral news. We classify other forecasts as
good (bad) news forecasts if forecast news is positive (negative). As reported in Panel B, 3,555
management forecasts (33 percent of the sample) are classified as good news, 5,067 (47 percent)
as bad news, and 2,177 (20 percent) as neutral news.10 The higher frequency of bad news is
consistent with the literature starting with Skinner (1994) and suggests that managers are more
likely to disclose bad news, presumably to reduce litigation risk.
8 As an alternative, we also use the random walk model to determine the market expectation for observations
without analyst forecasts, and doing so leads to qualitatively similar results.
9 By ‘‘quantitatively similar results,’’ we mean that the coefficients on the variables are almost the same and the p-
values are in the same range (e.g., greater than 0.10, [0.05, 0.10], [0.01, 0.05), less than 0.01). By ‘‘qualitatively
similar results,’’ we mean that the coefficients on the variables of interest are similar with small differences and
the coefficients remain significant (p-value equal to or less than 0.10) or insignificant (p-value greater than 0.10).
10 The proportions of good, bad, and neutral news forecasts are similar to those reported in the prior research (e.g.,
Lennox and Park 2006). Using other criteria to define neutral news, such as the bottom 10 percent, 15 percent, 25
percent, or 30 percent, leads to quantitatively similar results.
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Measurement of Key Variables
Management Forecast Range (Width) and Forecast Precision (Precision)
For range forecasts, Width is calculated as the difference between the upper- and lower-end
estimates, divided by the absolute value of the mid-point forecast. Width is 0 for point forecasts.11
As reported in Table 2, the mean (median) of Width is 0.117 (0.053), suggesting that the mean
(median) range is 11.7 percent (5.3 percent) of the mid-point of the forecast. More importantly,
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics of Management Forecasts
Panel A: Yearly and Quarterly Distribution of Management Forecastsa
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Total (%)
1999 45 59 79 84 267 (2.47%)
2000 58 96 89 171 414 (3.83%)
2001 181 296 330 357 1,164 (10.78%)
2002 287 383 380 389 1,439 (13.33%)
2003 276 360 393 488 1,517 (14.05%)
2004 340 457 533 530 1,860 (17.22%)
2005 376 478 505 610 1,969 (18.23%)
2006 440 573 602 554 2,169 (20.09%)
Total 2,003 2,702 2,911 3,183 10,799 (100.00%)
(18.55%) (25.02%) (26.96%) (29.47%) (100%)
Panel B: Management Forecast Newsb
All
Management
Forecasts
Management
Forecasts
before Insider
Sales
Management
Forecasts
before Insider
Purchases
Management
Forecasts
Not Followed by
Insider Trading
n % n % n % n %
Good news forecasts 3,555 32.92% 1,163 41.08% 401 28.30% 1,991 30.39%
Bad news forecasts 5,067 46.92% 877 30.98% 743 52.43% 3,447 52.62%
Neutral forecasts 2,177 20.16% 791 27.94% 273 19.27% 1,113 16.99%
Total 10,799 100% 2,831 100% 1,417 100% 6,551 100%
a This panel describes the characteristics of 10,799 management forecasts of the current period’s earnings issued in the
period 1999–2006.
b Good (bad, neutral) news forecasts refer to management forecasts for which the point estimate, or the mid-point of a
range forecast, is above (below, similar to) the average of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the
management forecast release date. Management forecasts are classified as neutral news if the absolute value of forecast
news (FN, defined as management forecast minus average analyst forecast scaled by pre-release price) is in the bottom
quintile of the sample distribution.
11 We find qualitatively similar results when we use the pre-forecast stock price as the deflator.
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there is a large variation in forecast width, which ranges from 0 (5th percentile) to 0.462 (95th
percentile).
For ease of interpretation, we use the negative of the forecast range as the dependent variable;
that is, forecast precision (Precision) is Width times 1. A larger value of Precision indicates a
more precise management forecast.
Management Forecast News (FN)
FN is calculated as the difference between the point or the mid-point estimate of the
management forecast of EPS and the consensus analyst forecast, scaled by the pre-release share
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
Percentile
5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Std.
Dev.
Forecast Width (Width) 0.117 0 0.018 0.053 0.121 0.462 0.211
Forecast Precision
(Precision)
0.117 0.462 0.121 0.053 0.018 0 0.211
Management Forecast News
(FN)
0.001 0.011 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.005
Insider Sell (InsiderSell) 0.262 0 0 0 1 1 0.440
Insider Buy (InsiderBuy) 0.131 0 0 0 0 1 0.337
Management Forecast Error
(Forecast Error)
0.003 0 0.0004 0.001 0.003 0.010 0.005
Firm Profitability (Loss) 0.073 0 0 0 0 1 0.260
Management Forecast
Horizon (Forecast
Horizon)
124 33 84 92 122 354 88
Return Volatility (Return
Volatility)
0.027 0.011 0.018 0.024 0.033 0.056 0.014
Research and Development
Expenditures (R&D)
0.051 0 0 0 0.069 0.243 0.093
Analyst Following (Analyst
Coverage)
8.210 3 4 6 11 20 7.630
Institutional Holding (INST) 0.651 0 0.537 0.705 0.832 0.945 0.245
Firm Growth (M/B) 3.642 1.075 1.787 2.662 4.146 10.019 3.274
Firm Size (Size) 9,235 205 693 1,938 6,316 39,083 28,610
Fair Disclosure (FD) 0.937 0 1 1 1 1 0.243
Litigation (Litigation) 0.298 0 0 0 1 1 0.458
Management Optimism
(Optimism)
0.305 0 0 0 1 1 0.460
Past Management Forecast
Precision (PPrecision)
0.300 0 0.045 0.200 0.484 1 0.305
Equity Issuance (Equity
Issuance)
0.010 0 0 0 0 0 0.084
Annual Forecast (Annual) 0.351 0 0 0 1 1 0.477
This table provides descriptive statistics on key variables for the sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts issued
in the period 1999–2006.
Please see Appendix A for variable definitions.
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price. The consensus analyst forecast is calculated as the average of the analyst forecasts issued in
the 90 days before the management forecast.12 To be consistent with quarterly forecasts, FN is
divided by 4 for annual forecasts. Both the mean and median of FN are significantly negative (p ,
0.01 based on untabulated tests).
Insider Trading (InsiderSell, InsiderBuy)
We obtain insider trading data from Thomson Financial. An insider is defined as a person who
serves as the CEO, president, or a director. We include all open market transactions of a firm’s
shares or options. As the volume of insider trading is highly skewed, we define two indicator
variables, InsiderSell and InsiderBuy, to capture the existence of insider trading over the 30-day
window after the management forecast. InsiderSell equals 1 when the net insider trading is a net
sale, such that insider sales are higher than insider purchases, and 0 otherwise. InsiderBuy equals 1
when the net insider trading is a net purchase, and 0 otherwise. Within our sample, 2,831 forecasts
(26 percent of the sample) are followed by insider sales, 1,417 (13 percent) by insider purchases,
and the remainder (61 percent) by no insider trading.13
Because prior research finds that managers are more likely to disclose good news before insider
sales and bad news before insider purchases, we first determine whether there are any observations
in our sample with bad news before insider sales and good news before insider purchases. Panel B
of Table 1 presents the distribution of management forecasts according to whether they are followed
by insider sales or purchases. Of the management forecasts issued before insider sales, 41 percent
are good news forecasts and 31 percent are bad news forecasts. Of those issued before insider
purchases, 28 percent are good news forecasts and 52 percent are bad news forecasts. In other
words, there are more good news forecasts than bad news forecasts before insider sales and more
bad news forecasts than good news forecasts before insider purchases. This observation is
consistent with the findings in previous studies (e.g., Cheng and Lo 2006). However, the frequency
with which bad news appears prior to insider sales and good news prior to insider purchases is not
trivial, consistent with managers’ fiduciary duty to provide information that updates and corrects
previous disclosures (Skinner 1994; Cheng and Lo 2006).
Empirical Design
We estimate the following model to examine the effect of insider trading incentives on the
relation between forecast news and forecast precision:14
Precision ¼ b0 þ b1FN þ b2InsiderSell þ b3FN3 InsiderSell þ b4InsiderBuy
þ b5FN3 InsiderBuy þ dControl Variables þ e; ð1Þ
where Precision is management forecast precision, FN is forecast news, InsiderSell is an indicator
12 We use the 90-day period to reduce the influence of stale analyst forecasts. Furthermore, if an analyst issues more
than one earnings forecast in this period, we run a robustness test using only the most recent forecast issued by
that analyst and obtain quantitatively similar results.
13 Rogers (2008) also finds that there are more management forecasts followed by insider sales than by insider
purchases. However, the total proportion of management forecasts followed by insider trading is higher in our
study than in his, most likely for two non-exclusive reasons. First, our sample periods are different. Rogers’
(2008) sample period is 1994–2002, whereas ours is 1999–2006. We find that insider trading activities have
increased substantially in recent years. Second, our sample selection criteria are different. Unlike Rogers (2008),
we require analyst forecast data and exclude qualitative forecasts.
14 Because Precision is 0 for point forecasts, we also use Tobit regression to estimate Equation (1) and the other
models in the paper in an untabulated sensitivity test, and the inferences remain the same. By ‘‘inferences remain
the same,’’ we mean that the untabulated results are consistent with the reported results in supporting or rejecting
the hypotheses.
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for net insider sales, and InsiderBuy is an indicator for net insider purchases. As previously
discussed, we expect forecast precision and forecast news to be positively correlated, implying that
b1 is expected to be positive. To test H1, we interact FN with InsiderSell and InsiderBuy,
respectively. H1 predicts that b3 is positive and b5 is negative. We use firm-clustering adjusted
standard errors to account for the possible correlations between observations of the same firm, as
suggested in Peterson (2009).
The control variables include a set of variables that are likely to influence management forecast
precision. First, prior research finds that forecast precision decreases with the uncertainty that
managers face when providing forecasts (e.g., Rogers and Stocken 2005). We proxy for uncertainty
using forecast error (Forecast Error), an indicator variable of negative earnings (Loss), forecast
horizon (Forecast Horizon), return volatility (Return Volatility), and research and development
expenditure (R&D). We expect negative coefficients on these five variables. Second, prior research
indicates that managers are more likely to provide precise forecasts when the demand for
information is higher (e.g., Baginski and Hassel 1997; Ajinkya et al. 2005; Lennox and Park 2006).
We use analyst coverage (Analyst Coverage), institutional ownership (INST), firm size (Size), and
growth opportunities (proxied for by the market-to-book ratio, M/B) to capture the capital markets’
demand for information. We expect positive coefficients on these variables. Third, we include an
indicator variable for the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (FD) and an indicator for
industries with high litigation risk (Litigation). We expect negative coefficients on these variables.
We also include indicator variables for optimistic management forecasts (Optimism) and annual
forecasts (Annual) because of their potential impact on forecast precision, although we do not have
predictions on these variables.
Fourth, we include the square of forecast news to control for potential nonlinearity (Choi et al.
2010) and the interactions between forecast news and several control variables (i.e., Litigation,
Forecast Horizon, and Loss) to control for their potential effects on the relation between forecast
news and forecast precision. In a sensitivity test, we also include the interaction terms between FN
and all of the other control variables, and our results on insider trading are quantitatively similar.
Fifth, like insider sales, equity issuance can also motivate managers to strategically affect stock
prices through voluntary disclosure (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 2000). Accordingly, we include an
indicator for equity issuance (Equity Issuance) and its interaction with forecast news. We expect a
positive coefficient on this interaction term. Finally, despite our efforts, we might still miss
important determinants of forecast precision. We include past management forecast precision
(PPrecision) to control for the impact of time-invariant omitted factors. Appendix A provides the
variable definitions for the control variables.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on control variables. The average forecast error is 0.003;
7.3 percent of the firms have a loss; the average forecast horizon is 124 days; the average return
volatility is 0.027; the average R&D expenditure is 5.1 percent of sales; the average analyst
coverage is 8.21; the average institutional ownership is 65.1 percent; the average M/B is 3.64; and
the average firm size is $9,235 million. About 94 percent of the forecasts are issued after 2000; 29.8
percent are issued by firms in industries with high litigation risk; 30.5 percent are optimistic when
compared with ex post earnings realization; 30 percent of past forecasts are point forecasts; 1
percent of the forecasts are followed by equity issuance; and 35.1 percent are annual forecasts.15
Table 3 provides the correlations for the independent variables. The magnitude of these
coefficients and the variance inflation factor (VIF) test suggest that multi-collinearity is not an issue
in our empirical tests.
15 The descriptive statistics on control variables are similar to those reported in other studies (e.g., Rogers 2008;
Rogers et al. 2009; Yang 2012).
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IV. MAIN ANALYSES
In this section, we first examine the impact of managerial incentives on forecast precision, and
we then examine how the three conditioning factors affect the relation between managerial
incentives and forecast precision.
TABLE 3
Correlation Matrix
Panel A: Correlation Matrix for Variables InsiderSell to Analyst Coverage
FN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(2) InsiderSell 0.15**
(3) InsiderBuy 0.02* 0.23**
(4) Forecast
Error
0.09** 0.06** 0.01
(5) Loss 0.30** 0.06** 0.01 0.30**
(6) Forecast
Horizon
0.15** 0.05** 0.05** 0.09** 0.08**
(7) Return
Volatility
0.21** 0.03** 0.03** 0.11** 0.36** 0.18**
(8) R&D 0.13** 0.05** 0.04** 0.04** 0.35** 0.10** 0.31**
(9) Analyst
Coverage
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.12**
(10) INST 0.06** 0.09** 0.01 0.04** 0.09** 0.03** 0.07** 0.03** 0.07**
(11) M/B 0.07** 0.10** 0.01 0.13* 0.05** 0.01 0.05** 0.14** 0.06**
(12) Size 0.17** 0.03** 0.03** 0.18** 0.21** 0.06** 0.36** 0.05** 0.34**
(13) FD 0.08** 0.06** 0.04** 0.02* 0.01 0.06** 0.16** 0.01 0.01
(14) Litigation 0.05** 0.07** 0.03** 0.02* 0.14** 0.09** 0.35** 0.51** 0.12**
(15) Optimism 0.01 0.09** 0.05** 0.20** 0.10** 0.17** 0.03** 0.05** 0.01
(16) PPrecision 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.04** 0.03** 0.07** 0.20** 0.10** 0.08**
(17) Equity
Issuance
0.03** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01*
(18) Annual 0.17** 0.00 0.04** 0.03** 0.12** 0.42** 0.27** 0.17** 0.08**
Panel B: Correlation Matrix for Variables M/B to Annual, continued from Panel A
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
(11) M/B 0.03**
(12) Size 0.03** 0.27**
(13) FD 0.10** 0.11** 0.04**
(14) Litigation 0.01 0.13** 0.01 0.01
(15) Optimism 0.06** 0.05** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04**
(16) PPrecision 0.01 0.15** 0.17** 0.35** 0.08** 0.01
(17) Equity Issuance 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02* 0.02** 0.01
(18) Annual 0.22** 0.01 0.10** 0.04** 0.15** 0.16** 0.09** 0.02*
*, ** Indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests.
This table reports the correlations among independent variables for the sample of 10,799 management earnings forecasts
issued in the period 1999–2006.
All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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Managerial Incentives, Forecast News, and Forecast Precision—Results for H1
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results for Equation (1) using the continuous variable
of forecast news. To facilitate comparison with the findings of Rogers (2008), the two columns
under the ‘‘Model (1)’’ heading report the results for the base model. As reported in the table, FN
(forecast news) has a positive coefficient, thus confirming the positive correlation between forecast
news and forecast precision. As previously discussed, Rogers (2008) uses the change in liquidity as
a measure of disclosure quality and finds that disclosures before insider sales are of higher quality
and those before insider purchases are of lower quality. To the extent that more (less) precise
forecasts are of higher (lower) quality, Rogers’ (2008) results imply a positive coefficient on
InsiderSell and a negative coefficient on InsiderBuy. Consistent with Rogers (2008), we find that
the coefficient on InsiderSell is significantly positive (p ¼ 0.059), suggesting that management
forecasts issued before insider sales are more precise. However, the coefficient on InsiderBuy,
although negative, is insignificant. The difference in results between the two studies may be driven
TABLE 4
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision: Tests of H1
Panel A: Regressions Based on Continuous Variable of Forecast Newsa
Variable Pred. Sign
Model (1) Model (2)
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept ? 0.261 0.001 0.264 0.001
FN þ 4.748 0.001 4.003 0.001
InsiderSell þ 0.008 0.059 0.009 0.027
FN 3 InsiderSell þ 7.866 0.001
InsiderBuy  0.002 0.371 0.011 0.037
FN 3 InsiderBuy  5.316 0.001
Forecast Error  1.508 0.071 1.512 0.067
Loss  0.117 0.001 0.117 0.001
Forecast Horizon  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Return Volatility  1.198 0.001 1.217 0.001
R&D  0.188 0.001 0.184 0.001
Analyst Coverage þ 0.006 0.954 0.006 0.975
INST þ 0.060 0.001 0.059 0.001
M/B þ 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.007
Size þ 0.017 0.001 0.018 0.001
FD  0.010 0.102 0.008 0.141
Litigation  0.008 0.159 0.008 0.132
Optimism ? 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011
PPrecision þ 0.102 0.001 0.102 0.001
Equity Issuance ? 0.094 0.053 0.095 0.049
Annual ? 0.086 0.001 0.085 0.001
FN 3 FN  33.417 0.236 77.166 0.056
FN 3 Litigation þ 3.442 0.014 3.474 0.011
FN 3 Forecast Horizon ? 0.991 0.280 1.141 0.211
FN 3 Loss ? 8.551 0.001 8.894 0.001
FN 3 Equity Issuance þ 17.864 0.047 18.643 0.038
Adjusted R2 21.07% 21.87%
(continued on next page)
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by differences in the samples and the measurement of disclosure quality.16 Overall, our results are
consistent with Rogers’s (2008) for insider sales, but not for insider purchases.
The two columns under the ‘‘Model (2)’’ heading in Panel A of Table 4 report the results of
testing H1. The coefficient on FN3 InsiderSell is significantly positive (p¼ 0.001), suggesting that
the positive correlation between forecast news and precision is stronger for management forecasts
issued before insider sales than for those issued at other times. In other words, consistent with H1,
prior to insider sales managers issue more precise forecasts when the news is more positive to
TABLE 4 (continued)
Panel B: Regressions Based on the Sign of Forecast Newsb
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. p-value
Intercept ? 0.217 0.001
Good þ 0.008 0.878
Bad  0.058 0.001
InsiderSell þ 0.005 0.107
InsiderSell 3 Good þ 0.015 0.005
InsiderSell 3 Bad  0.023 0.035
InsiderBuy  0.003 0.270
InsiderBuy 3 Good  0.034 0.005
InsiderBuy 3 Bad þ 0.021 0.011
Forecast Error  1.360 0.079
Loss  0.009 0.568
Forecast Horizon  0.001 0.001
Return Volatility  1.223 0.001
R&D  0.179 0.001
Analyst Coverage þ 0.003 0.841
INST þ 0.057 0.001
M/B þ 0.001 0.071
Size þ 0.015 0.001
FD  0.005 0.246
Litigation  0.018 0.995
Optimism ? 0.004 0.327
PPrecision þ 0.094 0.001
Equity Issuance ? 0.092 0.344
Annual ? 0.087 0.001
Good 3 Litigation þ 0.012 0.930
Bad 3 Litigation  0.064 0.001
Good 3 Forecast Horizon ? 0.015 0.008
Bad 3 Forecast Horizon ? 0.010 0.166
Good 3 Loss ? 0.132 0.047
Bad 3 Loss ? 0.079 0.141
Good 3 Equity Issuance þ 0.095 0.175
Bad 3 Equity Issuance  0.170 0.146
Adjusted R2 22.72%
(continued on next page)
16 Rogers’ (2008) findings on disclosure quality before insider purchases are relatively weak, with the impact of
insider purchases on disclosure quality being insignificant in several of his model specifications.
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increase the positive price reaction, and they issue less precise forecasts when the news is more
negative to reduce the price drop.
Also as expected, the coefficient on FN 3 InsiderBuy is significantly negative (p ¼ 0.001),
indicating that the positive correlation between forecast news and precision is weaker for forecasts
issued before insider purchases. In other words, consistent with H1, prior to insider purchases
managers issue less precise forecasts when the news is more positive to decrease the positive price
reaction, and they issue more precise forecasts when the news is more negative to increase the price
drop.
This analysis highlights the difference between our study and Rogers (2008), which focuses on
the main effect of insider trading on the quality of management forecasts regardless of the nature of
the news, whereas our analysis examines how the impact of insider trading on management forecast
precision varies with forecast news. The positive coefficient on InsiderSell indicates that
management forecasts issued before insider sales are more precise than those that are not followed
by insider trading. This finding is consistent with Rogers (2008). However, we find that more
positive news is associated with more precise forecasts and more negative news is associated with
less precise forecasts. Similarly, for management forecasts issued before insider purchases, the
negative coefficient on InsiderBuy is consistent with Rogers’ (2008) findings, but we find that the
more positive the news, the less precise the forecast, and the more negative the news, the more
precise the forecast. Put together, the findings of the two studies imply that both litigation concerns,
as Rogers (2008) argues, and insider trading considerations, which we emphasize, are important
determinants of management forecast quality in general and forecast precision in particular.17
TABLE 4 (continued)
This table reports regression analysis of the impact of insider trading on the relation between forecast news and forecast
precision. Panel A is based on the continuous variable of forecast news and Panel B is based on the sign of forecast news.
The regressions are estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in the period 1999–2006. p-values are based
on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests for other coefficients. We use
firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values.
Please see Appendix A for variable measurements.
a Panel A reports regression results from the following model:
Precision ¼ b0 þ b1FN þ b2InsiderSell þ b3FN3 InsiderSell þ b4InsiderBuy þ b5FN3 InsiderBuy
þ dControl Variables þ e: ð1Þ
b Panel B reports regression results from the following model:
Precision ¼ b00 þ b01Good þ b02Bad þ b11InsiderSell þ b12InsiderSell3Good þ b13InsiderSell3Bad
þ b21InsiderBuy þ b22InsiderBuy3Good þ b23InsiderBuy3Bad þ dControl Variables þ e:
ð10Þ
Good is an indicator variable that is 1 for management forecasts that are classified as good news and Bad is an indicator
variable that is 1 for management forecasts that are classified as bad news. Other management forecasts are neutral
forecasts. Good (bad, neutral) news forecasts refer to management forecasts for which the point estimate, or the mid-
point of a range forecast, is above (below, similar to) the average of the analyst forecasts issued in the 90 days before the
management forecast release date. Management forecasts are classified as neutral news if the absolute value of forecast
news (FN, defined as management forecast minus average analyst forecast scaled by pre-release price) is in the bottom
quintile of the sample distribution.
17 Rogers (2008) also discusses the impact of insider trading incentives. However, he posits that these incentives
prompt managers to issue low-quality forecasts to maintain their information advantage, regardless of the nature
of the news.
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The results for most of the control variables are consistent with prior research. For example, we
find that managers with an uncertain information set are more likely to provide vague forecasts and
are more likely to provide precise forecasts when the market demand for information is higher.
Furthermore, managers are more likely to issue vague forecasts when the forecast is optimistic,
potentially because of litigation concerns, and they are more likely to issue precise forecasts when
the forecast is an annual forecast. We also find forecast precision to be sticky; firms that issued more
precise forecasts in the past continue to issue precise forecasts in the future. With respect to the
interaction terms, we find that the positive association between forecast news and precision is
stronger in industries with greater litigation risk, weaker for firms reporting a loss, and stronger for
management forecasts issued before equity issuance.
Overall, we find the impact of insider trading on forecast precision to vary with forecast
news. For management forecasts issued before insider sales, the more positive the news, the more
precise the forecast, and vice versa. Such a strategy can increase the stock price or reduce the
impact of bad news before insider sales. In contrast, for management forecasts issued before
insider purchases, the more positive the news, the less precise the forecast, and vice versa. This
evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that managers strategically choose forecast precision
for self-serving purposes.
Our hypothesis suggests that both the sign and magnitude of forecast news matter in the
relation between insider trading and forecast precision, and accordingly we use the continuous
variable of forecast news (FN) in Equation (1) to capture the effects of both. However, it is unclear
whether the results reported thus far are driven by the magnitude of a given sign. To investigate
whether the results hold for the sign of the news and to further highlight the notion that the direction
of insider trading’s impact on forecast precision depends on the sign of the news, we estimate the
following regression:
Precision ¼ b00 þ b01Good þ b02Bad þ b11InsiderSell þ b12InsiderSell3Good
þ b13InsiderSell3Bad þ b21InsiderBuy þ b22InsiderBuy3Good
þ b23InsiderBuy3Bad þ dControl Variables þ e; ð10Þ
where Good (Bad) is an indicator variable for good (bad) news forecasts. Our hypothesis implies
that b12 and b23 are positive and that b13 and b22 are negative. The research design is similar to
Equation (1).
Panel B of Table 4 reports the regression results. The coefficient on InsiderSell 3 Good is
significantly positive, and that on InsiderSell3 Bad is significantly negative, thus suggesting that
good (bad) news forecasts issued before insider sales are more (less) precise than good (bad) news
forecasts not followed by insider trading. Also in line with our expectations, we find the coefficient
on InsiderBuy3Good to be significantly negative and that on InsiderBuy3Bad to be significantly
positive. This result suggests that good (bad) news forecasts issued before insider purchases are less
(more) precise than good (bad) news forecasts not followed by insider trading. That is, the results
reported in Table 4, Panel B confirm that the results reported above hold for the sign of the news.
In untabulated analysis, we further separate small good news forecasts from large good news
forecasts and small bad news forecasts from large bad news forecasts. We find a significant
incremental effect for large news, indicating that the magnitude of the news is also important. This
finding is intuitive. We argue that managers strategically determine forecast precision to increase
trading profits or to reduce trading losses, such that the more extreme the news, the greater the
potential gain and, thus, the stronger the incentive to make a strategic decision concerning forecast
precision. Given that the continuous variable FN captures both the sign and magnitude of forecast
news, we use it in the following analyses. The inferences remain the same when we use good news
and bad news indicators in the following analyses.
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Conditioning Analyses
We use the following regression model to test H2–H4:
Precision ¼ b0 þ b1FN þ b20InsiderSell þ b21FN3 InsiderSell
þ b22FN3 InsiderSell3Conditioning Variable þ b30InsideBuy
þ b31FN3 InsiderBuy þ b32FN3 InsiderBuy3Conditioning Variable
þ dControl Variables þ e; ð2Þ
where Conditioning_Variable is one of the three conditioning factors used to test H2–H4. In this
regression, coefficients b22 and b32 capture the way in which the conditioning factor affects the
strategic behavior related to insider trading, or more specifically, the effect that insider trading has
on the association between forecast news and forecast precision.
H2 predicts that managers’ incentive to strategically choose forecast precision is weaker in
firms with higher institutional ownership. We test H2 by replacing the conditioning variable in
Equation (2) with IH, the decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1]. H2 implies
that b22 is negative and b32 is positive. The results for Model (1) in Table 5 show that the coefficient
on FN3 InsiderSell3 IH is significantly negative (p¼0.004), and that on FN3 InsiderBuy3 IH is
significantly positive (p ¼ 0.043), suggesting that managers are less likely to strategically choose
forecast precision when institutional ownership is high than when it is low. This result is consistent
with the argument underlying H2 that institutional investors’ monitoring acts as a restraint against
managers’ opportunistic behavior in choosing forecast precision.18
H3 predicts that managers are less likely to use forecast precision for self-serving purposes
when good news precedes insider sales or when bad news precedes insider purchases. In both cases,
managers have to balance the potential benefits of an increase in forecast precision with the
potential increase in disclosure risk arising from more precise forecasts being more likely to be
proven wrong. We construct an indicator variable, DRISK, which is 1 for these cases, and 0 for
others (i.e., bad news preceding insider sales and good news preceding insider purchases), and then
interact it with FN3 InsiderSell and FN3 InsiderBuy. H3 implies that b22 is negative and b32 is
positive. The two columns under Model (2) of Table 5 report the regression results. The coefficient
on FN3 InsiderSell3DRISK is significantly negative (p¼ 0.001), and that on FN3 InsiderBuy3
DRISK is significantly positive (p ¼ 0.001), suggesting that managers are less likely to choose
forecast precision strategically when disclosure risk is high than when it is low.
H4 predicts that managers are more likely to choose forecast precision for self-serving purposes
when investors have more difficulty in assessing the precision of the information that managers
possess. To investigate this issue, we follow Rogers and Stocken (2005) and construct a variable to
capture such difficulty. More specifically, we construct a common factor based on six variables: the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when the management forecast is released, the
standard deviation of analyst forecast errors in the five years prior to the management forecast
release, an indicator for whether the firm has a loss preceding the forecast, the standard deviation of
daily stock returns in the year before the forecast date, the average bid-ask spread for the ten days
before the forecast date, and the standard deviation of the management forecast ranges before the
current forecast. We then construct a variable (DIFF), which is the decile rank of the difficulty
factor standardized to [0,1], with large values indicating more difficulty in assessing the precision of
18 Another commonly used proxy for external monitoring is board independence. We conduct a similar analysis and
find relatively weak evidence that the strategic behavior is less pronounced in firms with high board
independence. This is consistent with the mixed findings in prior research. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find
that forecast precision increases with board independence, whereas Ajinkya et al. (2005) find no such evidence.
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TABLE 5
Managerial Incentives and Management Forecast Precision
Conditioning Analyses: Test of H2–H4
Pred.
Sign
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept ? 0.264 0.001 0.260 0.001 0.245 0.001 0.244 0.001
FN þ 4.058 0.001 5.277 0.001 3.868 0.001 5.003 0.001
InsiderSell þ 0.010 0.014 0.042 0.001 0.009 0.027 0.038 0.001
FN 3 InsiderSell þ 12.855 0.001 18.158 0.001 2.046 0.144 18.991 0.001
FN 3 InsiderSell 3
IH
 9.992 0.004 7.986 0.011
FN 3 InsiderSell 3
DRISK
 23.944 0.001 22.315 0.001
FN 3 InsiderSell 3
DIFF
þ 9.064 0.003 3.225 0.124
InsiderBuy  0.012 0.032 0.018 0.990 0.012 0.024 0.017 0.981
FN 3 InsiderBuy  6.951 0.001 17.977 0.001 2.204 0.070 16.698 0.001
FN 3 InsiderBuy 3
IH
þ 4.039 0.043 4.315 0.048
FN 3 InsiderBuy 3
DRISK
þ 16.774 0.001 18.459 0.001
FN 3 InsiderBuy 3
DIFF
 3.997 0.029 5.021 0.033
DRISK ? 0.011 0.056 0.006 0.327
DIFF ? 0.042 0.001 0.039 0.001
Forecast Error  1.524 0.063 1.275 0.099 1.366 0.086 1.153 0.120
Loss  0.119 0.001 0.114 0.001 0.118 0.001 0.115 0.001
Forecast Horizon  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Return Volatility  1.225 0.001 1.133 0.001 0.358 0.165 0.341 0.174
R&D  0.185 0.001 0.191 0.001 0.190 0.001 0.198 0.001
Analyst Coverage þ 0.006 0.971 0.005 0.923 0.006 0.965 0.004 0.913
INST þ 0.060 0.001 0.058 0.001 0.059 0.001 0.060 0.001
M/B þ 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.026 0.002 0.012 0.001 0.033
Size þ 0.017 0.001 0.017 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.015 0.001
FD  0.008 0.144 0.009 0.106 0.018 0.009 0.018 0.009
Litigation  0.009 0.125 0.010 0.094 0.008 0.131 0.010 0.096
Optimism ? 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.028 0.011 0.014 0.010 0.032
PPrecision þ 0.102 0.001 0.099 0.001 0.104 0.001 0.102 0.001
Equity Issuance ? 0.096 0.024 0.095 0.049 0.095 0.048 0.095 0.048
Annual ? 0.085 0.001 0.086 0.001 0.092 0.001 0.094 0.001
FN 3 FN  83.759 0.039 70.508 0.927 67.709 0.072 66.859 0.921
FN 3 Litigation þ 3.227 0.016 3.275 0.015 3.730 0.007 3.394 0.011
FN 3 Forecast
Horizon
? 1.194 0.189 1.275 0.163 1.114 0.218 1.309 0.147
FN 3 Loss ? 9.201 0.001 8.400 0.001 9.034 0.001 8.480 0.001
FN 3 Equity Issuance þ 18.486 0.041 19.206 0.031 17.815 0.043 18.546 0.035
Adjusted R2 22.13% 22.81% 22.59% 23.57%
(continued on next page)
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managers’ information, and interact it with FN3 InsiderSell and FN3 InsiderBuy. H4 implies that
b22 is positive and b32 is negative.
19
The two columns under the ‘‘Model (3)’’ heading in Table 5 report the regression results. The
coefficient on FN 3 InsiderSell 3 DIFF is significantly positive (p ¼ 0.003), and that on FN 3
InsiderBuy3DIFF is significantly negative (p¼ 0.029). These results indicate that, as H4 predicts,
when investors have more difficulty in assessing the precision of managers’ information, managers
are more likely to choose forecast precision strategically.
The two columns under the ‘‘Model (4)’’ heading in Table 5 include all of the aforementioned
interaction terms to test the three hypotheses simultaneously. The results are consistent with those
previously discussed, indicating that the three conditioning variables capture different constructs
affecting managers’ strategic use of forecast precision to influence market perceptions.
In sum, we find that managers’ strategic behavior in the choice of forecast precision for self-
serving purposes is mitigated by institutional investors’ monitoring and the risk concerns arising
from an increase in the precision of forecasts, but facilitated by investors’ difficulty in evaluating
the precision of managers’ information.
V. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
This section first examines whether precise forecasts are associated with stronger market
reactions than vague forecasts, as reported in prior research. We then conduct several tests to
evaluate the robustness of our results. The results are not tabulated to save space, unless noted.
Are More Precise Forecasts Associated with Stronger Market Reactions?
As discussed in Section II, one of the key assumptions in our theoretical argument is that more
precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions than less precise forecasts. This
TABLE 5 (continued)
This table reports regression results from the following model:
Precision ¼ b0 þ b1FN þ b20InsiderSell þ b21FN3 InsiderSell
þb22FN3 InsiderSell3Conditioning Variable þ b30InsideBuy
þb31FN3 InsiderBuy þ b32FN3 InsiderBuy3Conditioning Variable
þdControl Variables þ e: ð2Þ
Conditioning_Variable is one of the three conditioning variables: IH, DRISK, and DIFF. IH is the decile rank of
institutional ownership standardized to [0,1] (with IH¼ 0 for firms with the lowest decile of institutional ownership and
IH¼1 for firms with the highest decile of institutional ownership). DRISK is an indicator variable for high disclosure risk
and it equals 1 if the forecast before insider purchases is bad news or if the forecast before insider sales is good news, and
0 otherwise. DIFF is the decile rank of the difficulty level of assessing the precision of managers’ information
standardized to [0,1] (with DIFF¼ 0 for firms with the lowest decile of difficulty level and DIFF¼ 1 for firms with the
highest decile of difficulty level). The regression is estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in the period
1999–2006. p-values are based on one-sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests
for other coefficients. We use firm-clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values.
Please see Appendix A for variable measurements.
19 We conduct a series of sensitivity tests to ensure that our results are robust to alternative measures of DIFF. For
example, we use a common factor after dropping any one of the six variables, or a common factor after dropping
the two variables with the lowest loadings in common factor analysis. The results of these tests are qualitatively
similar.
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section examines this issue by estimating the following regression:
Ret ¼ b0 þ b1FN þ b2Precision þ b3FN3Precision þ dControl Variables þ e; ð3Þ
where Ret is the cumulative stock return from the forecast release date to one day after, minus the
size-decile-matched CRSP index return in the same period. We expect a positive coefficient on
forecast news (FN). If more precise forecasts are associated with stronger market reactions, then we
would expect a positive coefficient on FN3 Precision. We also control for a set of variables that
prior research suggests are likely to affect the association between stock return and forecast news
(e.g., Baginski et al. 1993; Pownall et al. 1993).
Table 6 reports the regression results. As expected, the coefficient on FN is significantly
positive, which suggests that the market reaction increases with management forecast news. More
importantly, the coefficient on FN3 Precision is significantly positive, indicating that the market
response to management forecasts is stronger when the forecast is more precise. This result is
consistent with the finding in prior research and supports the assumption used in our hypothesis
development.
TABLE 6
Forecast Precision and Market Response to Management Forecasts
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. p-value
Intercept ? 0.004 0.286
FN þ 5.126 0.001
Precision ? 0.011 0.001
FN 3 Precision þ 0.412 0.046
Size ? 0.007 0.023
FN 3 Size  1.254 0.001
M/B ? 0.010 0.001
FN 3 M/B þ 0.537 0.002
Return Volatility ? 0.003 0.292
FN 3 Return Volatility þ 0.008 0.484
Multiple ? 0.008 0.001
FN 3 Multiple  0.323 0.002
PAccuracy ? 0.002 0.433
FN 3PAccuracy þ 0.125 0.767
Annual ? 0.009 0.001
FN 3 Annual  4.455 0.001
UE þ 0.225 0.100
UE 3 Size  0.563 0.028
UE 3 M/B þ 0.557 0.041
Adjusted R2 11.41%
This table reports regression results from the following model:
Ret ¼ b0 þ b1FN þ b2Precision þ b3FN3Precision þ dControl Variables þ e: ð3Þ
Ret is the event period abnormal return for the management earnings forecast, measured as the cumulative daily return
minus the size-decile-matched market return from the day of management forecast to one day after. The regression is
estimated based on 10,799 management forecasts issued in the period 1999–2006. We use the decile ranks of Precision
and control variables (except UE and Multiple) and standardize the ranks to the range of [0,1]. p-values are based on one-
sided tests for coefficients with predicted signs and are based on two-sided tests for other coefficients. We use firm-
clustering adjusted standard errors to calculate p-values.
Please see Appendix A for variable measurements.
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Self-Selection of Management Forecast Issuance
The sample used in the foregoing analyses only includes firms with management forecasts. As
management forecasts are voluntary, these analyses might be subject to self-selection bias. As is
common in the literature, we use Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model to control for the potential
self-selection bias. In the first stage, we follow Lennox and Park (2006) and Feng et al. (2009) in
modeling the likelihood of management issuing forecasts. For the second-stage regression, we add
the inverse Mills ratio to Equation (1), and obtain results quantitatively similar to those reported in
Panel A of Table 4.
Use of the Actual Magnitude of Insider Trading
The foregoing analyses follow previous studies (e.g., Rogers 2008) in using dummy variables
to indicate whether managers buy or sell on their own accounts. The use of dummy variables makes
it easier to interpret the results and increases the power of the tests because doing so imposes no
restrictions on the specific form of the relation between insider trading and managers’ incentives.
However, the use of dummy variables neglects the effect of the magnitude of trading because the
incentive to increase trading gains likely increases with the magnitude of trading. In a robustness
test, we replicate our main analysis using two alternative measures of the magnitude of insider
trading. The first is the log transformation of net insider sales (or purchases) in dollars. The second
is the log transformation of net insider sales (or purchases) calculated based on abnormal insider
trading, where abnormal insider trading is insider trading in the month after the management
forecast disclosure less the average insider trading in the previous 12-month period. Managers of
some companies may trade more than their counterparts in others for such reasons as a difference in
stock-based compensation. As in the main analyses, the coefficient on FN 3 InsiderSell (FN 3
InsiderBuy) is positive (negative), significant at the 0.003 level or better. That is, the inference
based on the magnitude of insider trading remains the same: the positive association between
forecast news and precision increases with insider sales and decreases with insider purchases.
Bundled Management Forecasts
Rogers and Van Buskirk (2011) find that management forecasts are usually issued together
with earnings announcements, which could result in noise and bias in the calculation of forecast
news. We use two approaches to address this issue. First, following previous studies (e.g., Waymire
1984), we replicate the analyses after including unexpected earnings as an additional control
variable if the management forecast is issued around an earnings announcement. Second, we follow
the method proposed and validated by Rogers and Van Buskirk (2011) to correct the measurement
bias of management forecast news. This method estimates the unobservable analyst expectation at
the time of the earnings announcement and then uses it to calculate forecast news. The inferences
remain the same when we use these two methods.
The Direction of Causality
In the foregoing analyses, we take insider trading as a given and examine how insider trading
incentives affect the precision of management forecasts. An alternative interpretation is that the
precision of management forecasts affects stock prices, which in turn affect insider trading. This
concern is not as serious in the current study as it is in prior research that uses the market reaction to
measure forecast news. Nevertheless, following Cheng and Lo’s (2006) research design, we adopt a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to address this concern. We first predict insider trading and
then use the predicted insider trading to capture managerial incentives. The results are quantitatively
similar to those reported.
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VI. CONCLUSION
This study examines whether managers strategically choose the level of forecast precision for
self-serving purposes. We find that the positive relation between forecast news and forecast
precision is stronger for management forecasts issued before insider sales and weaker for those
issued before insider purchases than for other management forecasts. As more precise forecasts are
associated with stronger market reactions, these results are consistent with our hypothesis that
managers strategically choose the level of forecast precision to influence the market reaction to their
forecasts, thereby increasing their trading gains.
We also examine three conditioning variables that affect managers’ tendency to manage
forecast precision. We find that managers are less likely to manage forecast precision when
institutional ownership is high, presumably because institutional investors can constrain managers’
opportunistic behavior through their monitoring. We also find that managers are less likely to do so
when such a strategy is associated with greater disclosure risk. In contrast, we find that managers
are more likely to manage forecast precision when investors have more difficulty in assessing the
precision of their information.
Our study contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by examining how managers
strategically determine forecast precision. Although managers have considerable discretion in
choosing the characteristics of their forecasts, the research to date sheds little light on how
managerial incentives affect these characteristics (Hirst et al. 2008). The analyses in this study show
that managerial incentives can affect forecast precision, thereby furthering our understanding of the
managerial decision-making process in the issuance of earnings forecasts.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Measurement
Panel A: Variables Used to Test Management Forecast Precision Hypotheses
Dependent Variables
Width Forecast width for a range or point forecast, calculated as the difference between the
high-end estimate and the low-end estimate, divided by the absolute value of the
mid-point of the estimate; Width is 0 for a point forecast; and
Precision Management forecast precision, defined as forecast width (Width) times 1.
Independent Variables of Interest
FN Forecast news, calculated as the difference between management forecast of EPS
(the point or the mid-point of the range forecast) and the consensus analyst
forecast of EPS issued in the 90 days before management forecast, scaled by the
pre-release share price;
InsiderSell Insider sale indicator, defined as 1 when the net insider trading (total purchases 
total sales) in the 30 days after the management forecast is negative, and 0
otherwise; and
InsiderBuy Insider purchase indicator, defined as 1 when the net insider trading (total purchases
 total sales) in the 30 days after the management forecast is positive, and 0
otherwise.
Control Variables
Forecast Error Management forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of the difference
between actual EPS and the management forecast of EPS, divided by the pre-
release share price;
Loss Loss indicator of actual EPS, defined as 1 if actual EPS is negative, and 0
otherwise;
Forecast Horizon Management forecast horizon, calculated as the number of calendar days between
the forecast release date and the corresponding earnings announcement date; we
use the log transformation in the correlation matrix and regression analysis;
Return Volatility Return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the
250 trading days prior to the management forecast release date;
R&D Research and development expenditures divided by sales;
Analyst Coverage Analyst coverage, defined as the number of unique analysts who provide earnings
forecasts in the 90 days before management forecasts; we use the log
transformation in the correlation matrix and regression analysis;
INST Institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of outstanding shares owned by
institutional investors per 13F in the quarter when management forecast is
released;
Size Firm size, calculated as the firm’s market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the
end of the quarter before the forecast; we use the log transformation in the
correlation matrix and regression analysis;
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX A (continued)
M/B Market-to-book ratio, calculated as the ratio of the market capitalization of equity
divided by the book value of equity at the end of the quarter before the forecast;
FD Indicator variable for the post-FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure) period, equal to 1
when a management forecast is issued after October 2000, and 0 otherwise;
Litigation Indicator variable for high litigation risk, equal to 1 if firms are within industries
with high litigation risk (i.e., four-digit SIC code between 2833 and 2836, 3570
and 3577, 3600 and 3674, 5200 and 5961, and 7370 and 7374), and 0 otherwise;
Optimism Indicator variable for forecast optimism, 1 if the management forecast (the point or
the mid-point estimate) is higher than the actual EPS, and 0 otherwise;
PPrecision Past management forecast precision, defined as the average precision for all
management forecasts issued before the current forecast; we use a dummy
variable to indicate the precision of past management forecasts, equal to 1 for the
point forecasts, and 0 for the range forecasts;
Equity Issuance Indicator variable for the occurrence of equity issuance, equal to 1 if the forecast is
followed by equity issuance in the next 30 days, and 0 otherwise; and
Annual Indicator variable for forecast of annual earnings, equal to 1 if a forecast is for
annual earnings, and 0 otherwise.
Conditioning Variables
IH Decile rank of institutional ownership standardized to [0,1]; IH ¼ 0 for firms with
the lowest decile of institutional ownership and IH ¼ 1 for firms with the highest
decile of institutional ownership;
DRISK Indicator for high disclosure risk, 1 if a disclosure of bad news precedes insider
purchases or a disclosure of good news precedes insider sales, and 0 otherwise;
and
DIFF Decile rank of the difficulty level of assessing the precision of managers’
information standardized to [0,1]; DIFF ¼ 0 for firms with the lowest decile of
difficulty level and DIFF ¼ 1 for firms with the highest decile of difficulty level.
The difficulty level is a common factor based on the following six variables: the
standard deviation of analyst forecasts outstanding when management forecast is
released, the standard deviation of analyst forecast errors for five years prior to
the forecast release, whether the firm has a loss preceding the forecast, the
standard deviation of daily stock returns in the year before the forecast date, the
average bid-ask spread for the ten days before the forecast date, and the standard
deviation of forecast ranges before the current forecast.
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX A (continued)
Panel B: Additional Variables Used to Test the Market Reaction to Management Forecasts
Dependent Variable
Ret Event period abnormal return for the management forecast, measured as the
cumulative daily return minus the size-decile-matched market return from the day
of the forecast to one day after.
Additional Control Variables
UE Earnings surprise, calculated as the difference between actual EPS and the consensus
analyst forecast of EPS before earnings announcement, scaled by pre-earnings-
announcement share price; it is set as 0 for management forecasts not issued with
earnings announcement;
Multiple Indicator variable for multiple events, equal to 1 if there is more than one
announcement (e.g., earnings announcements or other management forecasts), and
0 otherwise; and
PAccuracy Previous management forecast accuracy, defined as the forecast accuracy of
management forecasts relative to the accuracy of analyst forecasts, averaged over
all management forecasts issued before the current one. Management forecast
accuracy is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between actual EPS
and management forecast, divided by the pre-release share price and then
multiplied by 1; analyst forecast accuracy is calculated similarly.
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